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Abstract
This paper demonstrates a methodology to model and evaluate the fault tolerance characteristics of operational 
software. The methodology is illustrated through case studies on three different operating systems: the Tandem 
GUARDIAN fault-tolerant system, the VAX/VMS distributed system, and the IBM/MVS system. Measurements are 
made on these systems for substantial periods to collect software error and recovery data. In addition to investigat­
ing basic dependability characteristics such as major software problems and error distributions, we develop two lev­
els of models to describe error and recovery processes inside an operating system and on multiple instances of an 
operating system running in a distributed environment Based on the models, reward analysis is conducted to evalu­
ate the loss of service due to software errors and the effect of the fault-tolerance techniques implemented in the sys­
tems. Software error correlation in multicomputer systems is also investigated.
Results show that I/O management and program flow control are the major sources of software problems in 
the measured IBM/MVS and VAX/VMS operating systems, while memory management is the major source of 
software problems in the Tandem/GUARDIAN operating system. Software errors tend to occur in bursts on both 
IBM and VAX machines. This phenomenon is less pronounced in the Tandem system, which can be attributed to 
its fault-tolerant design. The fault tolerance in the Tandem system reduces the loss of service due to software 
failures by an order of magnitude. Although the measured Tandem system is an experimental system working under 
accelerated stresses, the loss of service due to software problems is much smaller than that in the measured 
VAX/VMS and IBM/MVS systems. It is shown that the software Time To Error distributions obtained from data 
are not simple exponentials. This is in contrast with the common assumption of exponential failure times made in 
fault-tolerant software models. Investigation of error correlations show that about 10% of software failures in the 
VAXcluster and 20% in the Tandem system occurred concurrently on multiple machines. The network-related 
software in the VAXcluster and the memory management software in the Tandem system are suspected to be 
software reliability bottlenecks for concurrent failures.
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I. Introduction
While hardware reliability has improved significantly in the past decades, improvements in software reliability 
have not been quite as pronounced. Hardware faults are generally well-understood and efficient hardware fault 
models exist; hardware fault tolerance is relatively inexpensive to implement. Unfortunately none of these is true 
for software. It is generally believed that software is the major source of system outages in fault-tolerant systems 
[Gray90]. Software faults are logically complex, poorly-understood, and hard to model. Besides, software fault 
tolerance is a moving target because software quality keeps changing with design updates and software varies 
significantly from system to system. To complicate matters, software interacts with hardware and the environment, 
blurring the boundaries between them.
This paper presents a common methodology to model and evaluate the fault tolerance characteristics of opera­
tional software. The methodology is illustrated through case studies on three different operating systems: the 
Tandem/GUARDIAN fault-tolerant system, the VAX/VMS distributed system, and the IBM/MVS system. A study 
of these three operating systems is interesting because they are widely used and are representative of the diversity in 
the field. The Tandem/GUARDIAN and VAX/VMS data provide high-level information on software fault toler­
ance. The MVS data provides detailed information on low-level error recovery. Our intuitive observation is that 
GUARDIAN and MVS have a variety of software fault tolerance features, while VMS has less explicit software 
fault tolerance.
Ideally, we would like to have measurements on different systems under identical conditions. The reality, 
however, is that differences in operating system architectures, instrumentation conditions, measurement periods, and 
operational environments make this ideal practically impossible. Hence, a direct and detailed comparison between 
the systems is inappropriate. However, it is worthwhile to demonstrate the applications of a modeling and evalua­
tion methodology on different systems. Also, these are mature operating systems which are slow-changing and have 
considerable common functionality. Thus, the major results can provide some high-level comparisons that point to 
the type and nature of relevant dependability issues.
The methodology proposed consists of the following steps:
(1) Error data reduction and classification — This step identifies software errors/failures and categorizes them bv
the affected system functions. *
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(2) Characterization of error time distributions — This step obtains empirical distributions to describe software 
error detection and recovery characteristics.
(3) Modeling and reward analysis — This step performs two levels of modeling and reward analysis.
(a) Low-level modeling of error detection and recovery in an operating system: this is illustrated using 
the DBM/MVS data.
(b) High-level modeling and evaluation of loss of work in a distributed environment: this is illustrated 
using the Tandem/GUARDIAN and VAX/VMS data.
(4) Investigation of error correlations — This step identifies concurrent software errors/failures on multiple 
instances of an operating system in a distributed environment and their sources.
The next section discusses the related research. Sections 3 and 4 describe measurements and error 
classifications. Section 5 characterizes error time distributions. Section 6 builds two levels of models to describe 
software fault tolerance and performs reward analysis to evaluate software dependability. Section 7 investigates 
errors correlations in distributed environments. Section 8 summarizes this study.
EL Related Research
Software reliability modeling has been studied extensively and a large number of models have been proposed 
[Musa87], However, modeling and evaluation of fault tolerant software systems are not well understood. A discus­
sion of key issues appeared in [Hecht86]. An analysis of failures and recovery of the MVS operating system running 
on an IBM 3081 machine was given in [Velardi84]. The study showed that 25% to 35% of all software failures 
were hardware-related and the system failure probability for hardware-related software errors was close to three 
times that for all software errors in general [Iyer85a]. A detailed analysis of software error and recovery in the 
MVS operating system was discussed in [Hsueh87]. More recently a wide-ranging analysis of failures in the MVS 
operating system and IBM database management systems is reported in [Sullivan91, Chillarege92].
Analytical modeling of fault tolerant software has been provided by several authors. In [Laprie84], an approxi­
mate model was derived to account for failures due to design faults; the model was used to evaluate a fault-tolerant 
software system. In [Scott87], several reliability models were used to evaluate three different software fault toler­
ance methods. Recently, more detailed dependability modeling and evaluation of two major software fault tolerance 
approaches — recovery blocks and N-version programming — have been proposed [Arlat90].
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Although an operating system is a complex software system, little work has been done on modeling and 
evaluation of fault tolerance on operating systems. Major approaches for software fault tolerance rely on design 
diversity [Avizienis84, Randell75]. However, these approaches are usually inapplicable to large operating systems 
due to immense cost in developing and maintaining these software. Still each of the measured operating systems 
has distinct fault tolerance features. Single-failure tolerance of the Tandem system — although not explicitly 
intended for tolerating software design faults — provides the GUARDIAN system with a significant level of fault 
tolerance. In the MVS system, software fault tolerance is provided by recovery management. The philosophy in 
MVS is that the programmer who writes a critical system function envisages typical failure scenarios and provides 
recovery routines for each failure, so as to prevent a total system loss.
IQ. Measurements
For this study, measurements were made on three different operating systems: the Tandem/GUARDIAN sys­
tem, the VAX/VMS system, and the IBM/MVS system. Table 3.1 summarizes the measured systems. These systems 
are representative of the diversity in the field in that they have varying degrees of fault tolerance embedded in the 
operating system. The Tandem/GUARDIAN system provides recovery from a wide range of software errors via the 
"Nonstop” environment The IBM/MVS system includes robust recovery management to tolerate software-related 
errors. The Quorum algorithm (to be discussed later) implemented in the distributed VAX/VMS system running on 
a VAXcluster makes the VAXcluster function as a fc-out-of-n fault-tolerant system. The following subsections intro­
duce the three systems and measurements.
Table 3.1. Summary of Systems
HW System SW System Architecture Fault-Tolerance Workload
Tandem Cyclone GUARDIAN Distributed Single-Failure Tolerance SW Development/T esting
VAXcluster VMS Distributed Quorum Algorithm Scientific Applications
IBM 3081 MVS Single Recovery Management System Design/Development
A. Tandem/GUARDIAN
The Tandem GUARDIAN system is a loosely-coupled multiprocessor system built for on-line transaction pro­
cessing [Katzman78]. High availability is achieved via single-failure tolerance. With multiple processors running
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process pairs, dual interprocessor buses, dual-port device controllers, disk mirroring, and redundant power supplies, 
a single failure in a processor, bus, device controller, disk, or power supply can be tolerated. Key software com­
ponents in the Tandem system are processes and messages [Bartlett78]. From a software perspective, a Tandem 
system can be viewed as a collection of processes constantly sending and receiving messages. The GUARDIAN 
operating system has extensive low-level software error detection mechanisms. GUARDIAN is also capable of 
detecting errors using the "I’m alive" message protocol. Each processor periodically sends an "I’m alive" message 
to all processors on the system including itself. If the operating system in a processor does not receive the "I’m 
alive" message from another processor, it declares that processor to be failed. Detected errors are corrected by 
software either at component or system level using redundancy.
The data for this study was obtained from the processor halt log. The processor halt log is a subset of the 
TMDS (Tandem Maintenance and Diagnostic System) event log maintained by the GUARDIAN operating system. 
This log consists of events generated by three types of sources: the operating system, hardware, and human inter­
vention. A software halt occurs when the operating system in a processor detects a problem that cannot be resolved. 
According to experienced Tandem engineers, software halts are mostly related to real software problems (i.e., 
software bugs). This is plausible considering the extensive hardware-error detection mechanisms in the Tandem 
system. Once a software halt occurs in a processor, a memory dump is taken from the processor, and the processor 
is reloaded. A fix is made later on based on the results of diagnosis using the memory dump.
Measurements were made on five systems — one field system and four in-house systems — for over a total of 
five system-years. Software halts are rare in the Tandem system and only one of the in-house systems had enough 
software halts for a meaningful analysis. This system was a Tandem Cyclone system used by Tandem software 
developers for a wide range of design and development experiments. It was operating as a beta site and was 
configured with old hardware. Sometimes the system was deliberately faulted for analysis. As such it is not 
representative of the Tandem system in the field. The measured period was 19 months (from July 1990 to January 
1992).
B. VAX/VMS
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The VAX/VMS error data was collected from two DEC VAXclusters. A VAXcluster is a distributed com­
puter system consisting of several VAX machines and mass storage controllers. These machines and controllers 
(nodes) are connected by the Computer Interconnect (Cl) bus organized as a star topology. Features of the VAX­
cluster include: nodes communicating based on a message-oriented interconnect and memory-to-memory block 
transfers, sharing of disk storage through the network (Cl bus and ports), and running a distributed version of the 
VAX/VMS operating system [Kronenberg86].
The VAX/VMS distributed operating system provides sharing of resources (devices, files, and records) among 
users. Major components to provide resource sharing include the file and record management services, disk class 
driver, lock manager, connection manager, and SC A software [Kronenberg86]. These routines manage the cluster­
wide resource sharing and communications. They are also responsible for coordinating the cluster members and han­
dling recoverable failures in remote nodes. For the purpose of this study, we will call all these software components 
HO management routines.
One of the VAXcluster design goals is to achieve high-availability by integrating multiple machines in a sin­
gle system. The Quorum algorithm [Kronenberg86] implemented in the distributed VAX/VMS system makes the 
VAXcluster function as a ¿-out-of-n system. Each operating system running in the VAXcluster has a parameter 
called VOTES and a parameter called QUORUM. If there are n machines in the system, each operating system usu­
ally sets its QUORUM to bt/2+1 J. The parameter VOTES is dynamically set to the number of machines currently 
alive in the VAXcluster. The processing of the VAXcluster proceeds only if VOTES is greater than or equal to 
QUORUM. Thus, the VAXcluster functions like an l/i/2+l J-out-of-n system.
The first system, VAX1, consisted of seven machines and four controllers. The data collection periods for the 
different machines in VAX1 varied from 8 to 10 months (during October 1987 — August 1988). The cumulative 
measurement time was 5.5 machine years. The second system, VAX2, consisted of four machines and one con­
troller. The data collection period was 27 months (January 1989 — March 1991). There were also 16 other small 
machines connected to VAX2 through an Ethernet during the measured period. Measurements were also made on 
these machines. The cumulative measurement time for VAX2 was 25.7 machine years. The two systems were used 
to provide service for scientists, engineers, and students for their research during the measured periods. The source
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of the error data was the ERROR_LOG files produced by the VAX/VMS operating system.
C. IBM/MVS
The MVS is a widely used IBM operating system. Primary features of the system are reported to be efficient 
storage management and automatic software error recovery. In the MVS environment errors are detected by both 
hardware and software facilities. The hardware detects conditions such as memory violations, program errors (e.g., 
arithmetic exceptions), and addressing errors. The software detects more complex error conditions. The data 
management and supervisor routines ensure that valid data are processed and non-conflicting requests are made. 
For example, these routines can detect an incorrect parameter specification in a system macro, or a supervisor call 
issued by an unauthorized program.
The MVS system attempts to correct software errors using recovery routines. The philosophy in the MVS is 
that for each major system function, the programmer envisages possible failure scenarios and writes a recovery rou­
tine for each. However, it is the responsibility of the installation (or the user) to write recovery routines for other 
programs. The installation can improve the error detection capability of the system by means of a software facility 
called Resource Access Control Facility (RACF). The RACF is used to build detailed profiles of system software 
modules. These profiles are used to inspect the correct usage of system resources. The user can also employ other 
software facilities to detect the occurrences of selected events. In addition, the operator can detect some evident 
error conditions and decide to cancel or restart a job.
The detection of an error is recorded by an operating system module. The software record contains the infor-
/
mation about the event that caused the record to be generated and a 12-bit error symptom code describing the reason 
for the abnormal termination of a program. The total number of implemented error codes is more than 500.
Measurements were made on an IBM 3081 mainframe running the IBM/MVS operating system. The system 
consisted of dual processors with two multiplexed channel sets. Time-stamped, low-level error and recovery data on 
errors affecting the operating system functions were collected. During the measured period, the system was used 
primarily to provide a time-sharing environment to a group of engineering communities for their daily work on sys­
tem design and development. The measurement period was one year.
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IV. Error Classification
In this section we identify software errors by processing the raw data and categorize these errors by the 
affected system function. A common step in data processing for all these systems is the data coalescing. In a com­
puter system, a single problem commonly result in many repeated error observations occurring in rapid succession. 
To ensure that the analysis is not biased by repeated observations of the same problem, all error entries which have 
the same error type and occur within a short time (usually five minutes) interval of each other should be coalesced 
in data processing. However, the coalescing algorithms used in the three systems are not identical. Also, the error 
classification is different for the three systems. This is because these systems have different hardware and software 
architectures and error detection mechanisms. In the following discussion, major sources of software problems for 
these systems are identified by statistical analysis. This information can only be obtained from measurement-based 
analysis and can be used in designing techniques for software fault tolerance.
A. Tandem/GUARDIAN
The first step of the analysis was to identify event clusters for individual operating systems using the software 
failure data from the processor halt log. An event cluster consists of a sequence of related events ending with an 
event representing the recovery of a failed operating system. An event cluster represents an operating system failure 
and identifies the time period during which the operating system is unavailable. We also created event clusters 
using the non-software failure data from the processor halt log in a similar fashion. Further details of the data pro­
cessing are given in [Lee91].
The processor halt log also provides information about the instruction processing environments (i.e., apparent 
causes of software halts from the operating system perspective and processes which were executing) prior to the 
occurrence of software halts. Table 4.1 shows the apparent causes of the collected software halts. The codes A, B, 
C, and D in the third column of the table will be used to refer to the cause later. The table shows that software halts 
occurred most frequently due to problems in accessing the system disk. Each processor in the system has its own 
copy of the kernel in its main memory, but it relies on the system disk, which is accessed through either processor 0 
or 1, for all additional operating system related procedures and files. As a result, a problem in accessing the system 
disk can cause software halts in multiple processors on the system. This explains why it was the most frequent
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Table 4.1. Apparent Cause of Software Halt (Tandem)
Software Subsystem # Events Cause Breakdown # Events
Process Control 32 (A) illegal address reference by 
interrupt handler or system process
(B) arithmetic overflow occur to 
interrupt handler or system process
(C) memory manager read error, 
potentially related to system disk access
(D) program internal error
9
4
18
1
Memory Management 7 (A) page or byte unlock error 1
(B) illegal attempt to deallocate segment or
bad segment table entry 3
(C) unexpected page fault or
too many errors on a processor switch 2
(D) physical-page table and segment page table mismatch 1
Message System 14 (A) processor unsynchronized 1
(B) unable to send "I’m alive" message to itself 6
(C) declared down by the other live processors 7
Processor Control 1 instruction failure or sequence error on boot 1
Hardware-Related 21 (A) uncorrectable memory error 1
(B) software encounter unexpected problem
during recovery from power failure 15
(C) unexpected interrupt or trap 5
Application Software 4
Unknown 3
cause of the software halts. Problems with the system disk can be caused by software faults or double component 
failures such as near-coincident halts in processors 0 and 1.
The second most frequent cause of software halts was an unexpected problem such as insufficient status infor­
mation found by software during a recovery from a power failure. This could be due to design faults in the software 
that handles such recovery. The third most frequent cause of software halts was an illegal address reference by an 
interrupt handler or a system process.1 Illegal address references can occur due to underlying software faults or 
undetected hardware errors. Other frequent causes of software halts were failures in sending or receiving the "I’m 
alive" message. The underlying cause of this can be an operating system failure, a processor hardware failure, or 
interrupt bursts from faulty hardware. The interrupt bursts would interfere with the message interrupt handling. The 
"I’m alive" protocol allows problems to be identified by the operating system on which the problem occurs, or by
‘System processes consist of a small number of privileged processes. Examples are the monitor process, the memory manager, the operator 
process, and the I/O processes.
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other operating systems. Obviously this protocol plays an active role in detecting processor software halts at a high 
level.
Table 4.2 shows a breakdown of the software halts based on the processes which were executing prior to the 
occurrence of software halts. The process that was executing points to the likely problem source. The third column 
of the table lists the cause of the halt (Table 4.1 nomenclature). "Non-process" refers to no specific process and 
indicates that an interrupt handler or special operating system procedure such as an idle loop was executing. The 
system monitor runs in each processor chi the system. This process handles housekeeping functions and initiates 
process creation and deletion within a processor. Like the system monitor, the memory manager runs in each pro­
cessor. This process services special requests from page-fault interrupt handler to bring needed pages into processor 
memory from disk. "All others" refers to a collection of about twenty processes. No more than two software halts 
occurred while each of these processes was executing.
The table clearly shows that software halts occurred mostly frequently while the memory manager process 
was executing to provide services to user applications. The most frequent cause of these halts was problems in 
accessing the system disk. The second most frequent cause was illegal address references by the memory manager 
process. The occurrence of software halts due to this cause did not show specific pattern. The fact that there were 
eight software halts due to this cause (Tables 4.1 and 4.2) indicates that these are likely to be due to underlying 
software faults.
B. VAX/VMS
Table 4.2. Active Process at Software Halt (Tandem)
Process # Events Cause Breakdown # Events
Non-process 22 memory management (Q  
message system (A, B, Q  
hardware-related (A, B) 
unknown
2
6
13
1
System Monitor 4 processor control 1
memory management (B) 3
Memory Manager 28 process control (A, Q 27
memory management (D) 1
Unknown 4 hardware-related (Q 4
All Others 24
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The time-stamped VAX log contained information on both errors and failures. An error was defined as an 
abnormality in any component of the system. If an error led to a termination of the system service on a machine, it 
was defined as a. failure. A failure was identified by a reboot report following one or multiple error reports. Based 
on the information provided by the error logs, errors were classified into three categories: hardware, software, and 
unknown. Hardware errors included five different types: CPU, memory, disk, tape, and network errors. Errors of the 
same type occurring within five minutes of each other were coalesced into a single error event. Details of the meas­
urements and data processing can be found in [Tang92a].
Software errors were identified from '’bugcheck" reports in the log files and divided into three types:
(1) Control — Problems involving program flow control or synchronization. For example, "Unexpected system 
service exception", "Exception while above ASTDEL or on interrupt stack", and "Spinlock(s) of higher rank 
already owned by CPU".
(2) Memory — Problems related to memory management or usage. For example, "Bad memory deallocation 
request size or address”, "Double deallocation of memory block", "Page fault with IPL too high”, and "Kernel 
stack not valid”.
(3) I/O — Inconsistent conditions detected by I/O management routines. For example, "Inconsistent I/O data 
base", "RMS has detected an invalid condition", "Fatal error detected by VAX port driver", "Invalid lock id", 
and "Insufficient nonpaged pool to remaster locks on this system".
Table 4.3 shows the software error frequency, percentage, and associated failure probability, by error type for 
the measured VAX/VMS systems. The failure probability is defined as the failure frequency divided by the error 
frequency. It is seen that control errors are the dominant type of error (57%). However, closer examination of the 
data shows that some of control errors were related to network errors, which probably occurred in I/O management 
routines. These errors should be regarded as I/O errors. That is, the actual percentage of I/O errors is higher than 
that (36%) in the table. Thus, for the measured VAX/VMS systems, major software problems are from program 
flow control and I/O management
The table shows that the failure probability of software errors is high (0.76). This is in contrast with the low 
failure probability of hardware errors (<0.01) shown in [Tang92a]. In the two VAXclusters, software failures
11
constitute approximately 23% of all machine failures. That is, the impact of software failures on system dependabil­
ity for the measured systems is significant
Table 4.3. Statistics for VAX/VMS Software Errors
Type Control Memory I/O All
Error Frequency 97 12 60 169
Percentage 57.4 7.1 35.5 100
Failure Probability 0.86 0.58 0.68 0.76
C. IBM/MVS
For the MVS system, two levels of data coalescing were performed [Hsueh87]. First identical error entries 
which occurred within five minutes of each other were coalesced into a single record. Second, different error 
records occurring in close proximity in time (i.e., within 15 minutes of each other) were merged into a single error 
group. The first step eliminates multiple identical entries due to the same problem. The second step provides a 
mechanism to identify error bursts containing multiple but different error records. The reduced software errors were 
then classified into the following eight types:
(1) Control (CTRL) — invalid use of control statements or invalid supervisor calls
(2) Deadlocks (DLCK) — endless loops or wait states, or violation of system- or user-defined time limits
(3) I/O & Data Management (I/O) — errors occurring during I/O management or during creation/processing of 
data sets
(4) Storage Management (SM) — errors in storage allocation/deallocation or in virtual memory mapping
(5) Storage Exceptions (SE) — addressing of nonexistent or inaccessible memory locations
(6) Programming Exceptions (PE) — program errors (e.g., arithmetic overflow) other than storage exceptions
(7) Others (OTHR) — errors which don’t fit any of the above categories
(8) Multiple Errors or Error Bursts (MULT) — error bursts consisting of different types (listed above) of errors
Table 4.4 lists the frequencies of the software errors defined above. The table shows that more than a half 
(52.5%) of the software errors were I/O & data management errors, i.e., the major source of software errors is I/O & 
data management. A significant percentage (17.4%) of the errors were classified as multiple errors.
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Table 4.4. Statistics for IBM/MVS Software Errors
Type of Errors Freauencv Percent
Control 213 7.72
Deadlock 23 0.84
I/O & Data Management 1448 52.50
Program Exceptions 65 2.43
Storage Exceptions 149 5.40
Storage Management 313 11.35
Others 66 2.32
Multiple Error 481 17.44
Total 2758 100.00
D. Summary
In the IBM/MVS system, the major source of software errors was VO & data management This is in agree­
ment with the results from the VAX/VMS system where program flow control and VO management were the major 
sources of software errors. However, memory management was the major source of software halts in the 
Tandem/GUARDIAN system. This difference is mainly attributed to the different hardware and software architec­
tures among these systems. In the VAXcluster, programs highly rely on resource sharing through communications 
across the network. A lot of problems arose from the network related hardware and software which are suspected to 
be a reliability bottleneck. In the Tandem system, memory management implicitly involves lots of activities includ­
ing inter-process communications through inter-processor buses as well as disk accesses because each processor 
controls a subset of the disks in the system and files are distributed to all disks. As a result, there is a more chance 
of software halt occurring due to memory management
V. Time To Error Distributions
Actual Time To Error (TIE) distributions are essential in evaluating software dependability. Often, for sim­
plicity or due to lack of information, TIE or Time Between Error (TBE), and Time To Recovery (TTR) are 
assumed to be exponentially distributed [Arlat90]. An early measurement-based study showed that the software 
Time Between Failures (TBF) in a VM/CMS system had a Weibull distribution [Iyer85b]. This section investigates 
TTE (or TBE) and TTR distributions in the measured systems.
A. TBE Distributions
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Before presenting TBE distributions, we first explain how a TBE distribution is obtained from a multicom­
puter system such as the VAXcluster or Tandem system. We use the VAXcluster to illustrate the procedure. In a 
VAXcluster, all machine members are working in a similar environment and running the same version of the VMS 
operating system. If the VAXcluster is viewed as a single resource, then every software error on all machines can 
be sequentially ordered and a distribution can be constructed. In this way, the whole system is treated as a single 
entity in which multiple instances of an operating system are running concurrently. The constructed TBE distribu­
tion describes the software error characteristics for the whole system. We will call this distribution the multicom­
puter software TBE distribution.
Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 show the empirical TBE or TTE distributions fitted to analytic functions using SAS 
[SAS85] for the three measured systems. All these distributions failed to fit simple exponential functions. The 
fitting was tested using Kolmogorov-Smimov test or Chi-square test at 0.05 significance level. The two-phase 
hyperexponential distribution provided satisfactory fits for the VAXcluster and Tandem multicomputer software 
TBE distributions. An attempt to fit the MVS TBE distribution to a phase-type exponential distribution led to a 
large number of stages. As a result, the following multi-stage gamma distribution was used:
/ ( 0  = £  aig(t; a ,, Si) 
*=l
«•
where 0, £<z,=l, and
/=!
g(t; a , j ) =
—-—(V-sY*-1r(a)v ’ *
A five-stage gamma distribution provided a satisfactory fit.
t < s, 
t > s .
(5.1)
(5.2)
The results show that the multicomputer software TBE distribution (VAX/VMS and Tandem/GUARDIAN) 
can be modeled as a probabilistic combination of two exponential random variables, which shows that there are two 
dominant error modes. The higher error rate, X^ , with occurrence probability a 2, captures both the error bursts 
(multiple errors occurring on the same operating system within a short period of time) and concurrent errors (multi­
ple errors on different instances of an operating system which interact with each other) on these systems. The lower 
error rate, Xj, with occurrence probability oq, captures regular errors and provides interburst error rate.
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Figure 5.1. TTE Distribution (MVS)
Figure 5.2. TBE Distribution (VAX1) Figure 5.3. TBH Distribution (Tandem)
The VAX1 data (Figure 5.2) shows that a significant portion of the TBE instances (42%) are less than one 
day. This is in agreement with the existence of multiple errors (i.e., error bursts) in the IBM/MVS system. How­
ever, most of the VAXcluster TBE instances in the bursts are from a half hour to several hours which is longer than 
those instances in the IBM/MVS. A few TBE instances in VAX1 are less than a half hour. The software errors 
associated with these instances occurred on different machines. This indicates that some errors are correlated (this 
issue will be discussed further in section 7). Recall that we have used a coalescing algorithm to merge error reports 
within five minutes of each other. However, after this processing, there are still error burst phenomena.
These error bursts may be repeated occurrences of the same software problem, or multiple effects of an inter­
mittent hardware fault on the software. Actually, software error bursts have been observed in laboratory experi­
ments reported in [Bishop88]. The study showed that, if the input sequences of the software under investigation are 
correlated (rather than being independent), one can expect more "bunching" of failures than those predicted using a 
constant failure rate assumption. In an operating system, input sequences (user requests) are highly likely to be
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correlated. Hence, a defect area can be triggered repeatedly.
Figure 5.3 shows that the probability of error bursts in the Tandem system (0.13) is lower than that in the 
VAXcluster (0.32). That is, software halt bursts in the Tandem system are not as pronounced. This can be attri­
buted to differences in the quality of software and error detection mechanisms. The Tandem system is designed for 
fault tolerance from the scratch, and the GUARDIAN operating system is believed to be more robust and less likely 
to cause repeated problems in a short time. In addition, the Tandem system is equipped with extensive hardware 
error detection mechanisms. Most hardware errors in the Tandem system are detected by hardware and corrected by 
software, and hence there is less chance that intermittent hardware errors cause repeated software errors.
It is clear that the measured TBE (or TTE) is not exponentially distributed. This result is in contrast with the 
typical assumption made in software dependability modeling [Arlat90]. The results do, however, conform with the 
previous measurements on IBM [Iyer85b] and DEC [Castillo81] machines. Several reasons for this non-exponential 
behavior, including the impact of workload, were documented in [Castillo81].
B. TTR Distributions
Figure 5.4 shows the spline-fit for the TTR distribution of multiple errors in the MVS system. The figure also 
shows an three-phase hyperexponential function to approximate the distribution. Figures 5.5 and 5.6 plot the empir­
ical software TTR distributions for VAX1 and the Tandem system. Due to their peculiar shapes, we provided the 
raw distributions. Since most MVS software errors do not lead to system failures, the TTR for multiple errors,
Figure 5.4. MVS Multiple Error TTR Distribution (fitted)
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which take the longest time to recover among all software error types in the MVS system, is still short. Most TTR 
instances are less than 10 minutes; suggesting that most often reload (at least temporarily) cleared the problems.
In VAX1 (Figure 5.5), most of the TTR instances (85%) are less than 15 minutes. This is attributed to those 
errors which are recovered by on-line recovery or automatic reboot without shutdown repair. However, some TTR 
instances last as long as several hours (the maximum is about 6.6 hours). These failures are, in our experience, 
probably due to a combination of software and hardware problems.
Figure 5.6 shows that the software recovery time in the Tandem system is longer than that in the VAXcluster. 
This is most likely due to the human factor in system maintenance. If a software halt occurs in the Tandem system, 
a memory dump is taken and then the halted processor is reloaded. Most software halts occur on one operating sys­
tem. Since the system can tolerate a single operating system failure, operations tend to collect on-line information 
for diagnostic uses before attempting a recovery. This explains why the recovery time was longer in the Tandem 
system.
Typically, analytical models assume exponential or constant recovery times. Our results show that this does 
not apply generally. We have seen that all three TTR distributions are not simple exponentials. For the MVS sys­
tem, since the recovery is usually quick, a constant recovery time assumption may be suitable. For the VAXcluster 
and Tandem systems, neither exponential nor constant recovery time can be assumed. More complex "multi-mode" 
functions may be needed to model these TTR distributions.
To summarize, significant software errors were found to occur in bursts on both IBM and VAX machines.
This phenomenon is less pronounced in the Tandem system, which can be attributed to its fault-tolerant design. The
Figure 5.5. VAX1 Software TTR Distribution 
(sample size = 95)
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Figure 5.6. Tandem Software TTR Distribution 
(sample size = 50)
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measured software TBE and TTR distributions failed to fit simple exponential functions. This is in contrast with the 
common assumption of exponential failure times made in analytical modeling of software dependability. It was 
shown that a multicomputer software TBE distribution can be modeled by a two-phase hyperexponential random 
variable: a lower error rate captures regular errors, and a higher error rate captures error bursts and concurrent 
errors on multiple machines.
VL Modeling and Analysis
This section presents two levels of modeling and reward analysis to describe and evaluate the dynamic 
software dependability behavior. Low-level modeling focuses on error detection and recovery inside an operating 
system, while high-level modeling and reward analysis deals with distributed systems where multiple instances of 
operating systems interact. The IBM/MVS data is suited for illustrating the lower-level modeling, while the 
Tandem/GUARDIAN and VAX/VMS data are suited for illustrating the higher-level modeling and reward analysis. 
The two-level modeling and reward analysis not only allows us to evaluate software fault tolerance and software 
dependability, but also provides a framework to model complex software systems in a hierarchical fashion. We first 
presents the high-level modeling and reward analysis, and then presents the low-level modeling.
A. Distributed Operating System
In distributed environments such as the Tandem and VAXcluster systems, multiple instances of an operating 
system are running, and these instances form a single overall software system. This subsection discusses a high- 
level modeling to analyze this complex overall software system. Each instance of an operating system is treated as 
a software element of the overall software system, and software fault tolerance is discussed at a high level. The 
modeling is illustrated using the Tandem/GUARDIAN and VAX/VMS data.
The Tandem/GUARDIAN operating system closely interacts with hardware to provide software fault tolerance 
at system level. The GUARDIAN is robust and is equipped with extensive mechanisms to detect errors on 
software. Built-in single-failure tolerance allows the system to tolerate detected software errors using redundancy at 
system level. In a VAXcluster, the system-level software fault tolerance is provided by the Quorum algorithm. The 
VAXcluster can function as a k —out—of —n system.
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Figure 6.1. Model Structure
We constructed two-dimensional continuous-time Markov models using the software error data from the Tan­
dem and VAXcluster systems. Figure 6.1 shows the model structure. In the model the state Sitj represents that, 
among a total of n systems, i are in an error state, and J are in a failure state, and (n -  i -  j ) are running error-free. 
The state transition probabilities were estimated from the measured data. For example, the state transition probabil­
ity from state Sitj to state 5 ,j+1 was obtained from
observed number of transitions from state Sitj to state Si>/+1 
Pu.j).iU+i) observed number of transitions from state Sq (6. 1)
To quantify the impact of software errors on overall software dependability, we define two reward functions 
for the Markov models. The first applies to a non single-failure tolerant system such as the VAXcluster and the 
second applies to a single-failure tolerant system such as the Tandem system.
NS FT (No Single-Failure Tolerance) Reward Function:
We first define the reward function for a non single-failure tolerant system. In this case the system allows 
recovery from minor errors, but a major failure results in degradation. Given a time interval AT, a reward rate for a 
single operating system is defined as
r(AT) = W(AT)l  AT (6.2)
where W (AT) denotes the useful service time provided by the operating system during the AT and is calculated by
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AT in normal state
W(AT) = - AT -  cx in error state 
0 in failure state
(6.3)
where c is the number of raw errors occurring on the operating system during the AT and x is the mean recovery 
time for a single error. Thus, one unit of reward is given for each unit of time when the operating system is in the 
normal state. In an error state, the reward loss depends on the amount of time the operating system spends on error 
recovery. (If AT is less than cx, W(AT) is set to 0.) In a failure state, the reward is zero. In a distributed environ­
ment, the reward is also inversely proportional to the number of failed systems.
With the above definition, the reward rate for state Sq  in the model (Figure 6.1) is obtained from
n - i - c T - l  
l'J n
(6.4)
where c is the average number errors occurring in an operating system, per unit time, in state Sq , and n is the total 
number of systems. Here each operating system failure causes degradation.
SFT (Single-Failure Tolerance) Reward Function:
The Tandem system allows recovery from minor errors and also a single major failure causes no loss of ser­
vice in the Tandem system. To describe the built-in single-failure tolerance, we modify the reward rate (Equation 
6.4) as follows:
r- . =  -<ri,j -
n -  i-cx -  / 
n
n -  vex  — 7 + 1
if j  = 0 or j  = n 
if 1 <j < (rt-1) .
(6.5)
Here we assume that the system can tolerate a single operating system failure (i.e., a single processor software halt) 
without noticeable performance degradation. Thus the first failure causes no reward loss. For the second and subse­
quent failures, the reward loss is proportional to the number of these failures.
Given the Markov reward model described above, the expected steady-state reward rate, Y, can be estimated 
from [Trivedi92]
^  ~ X  ri,i '
S (6.6)
where S is the set of valid states in the model and d>i j is the steady-state occupancy probability for state 5, y . The
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steady-state reward rate represents the relative amount of useful service the system can provide per unit time in the 
long run, and can be regarded as a measure of software system service capability. The steady-state reward loss rate, 
(1 -  y), represents the relative amount of service lost per unit time due to software errors in the long run. If we 
consider a specific group of errors in the analysis, the steady-state reward loss quantifies the performance loss due to 
this group of errors.
Table 6.1 shows the estimated steady-state reward loss for the Tandem and VAXcluster systems. The table 
shows the reward losses due to software as well as non-software problems. It is seen that software problems 
account for 27% of the service loss incurred by all problems in the Tandem system, while they account for 12% of 
the service loss incurred by all problems in the VAXcluster system. This indicates that software is not a dominant 
source of service loss in the measured VAXcluster system, while software is a significant source of service loss in 
the measured Tandem system. A census of Tandem system availability [Gray90] has shown that, as the reliability^ 
of hardware and maintenance improves significantly, software is the major source (62%) of outages in the Tandem 
system. Our results corroborate this finding.2 Although the measured Tandem system was an experimental system, 
it has a smaller reward loss (by an order of magnitude) due to software problems. The same observation was made 
for the reward loss due to non-software problems. These observations demonstrate the high dependability of the 
measured Tandem system. In the VAXcluster, closer examination shows that most service loss due to non-software 
was actually incurred by hardware.
What Does Single-Failure Tolerance Buy?
Table 6.1. Steady-State Reward Loss
System Measure Software Non-Software Total
Tandem
Reward Loss 0.00006 0.00016 0.00022
Percentage 27.3 72.7 100
VAXcluster
Reward Loss 0.00077 0.00565 0.00642
Percentage 12.0 88.0 100
"Note that it is inappropriate to directly compare our number with Gray’s because Gray’s is an aggregate of many systems and ours is 
measurement on a single system.
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The Tandem/GUARDIAN data allows us to evaluate the impact of built-in software fault tolerance on system 
dependability and to relate loss of service to different software components. We performed reward analysis using 
the two reward rates defined above (SFT and NSFT) to evaluate the reduction in reward loss (loss of service) due to 
the software fault tolerance. The reward rate defined in Equation 6.4 allows us to determine the reward loss assum­
ing no SFT. The reward rate defined in Equation 6.5 measures reward loss under SFT. The ratio of the two 
rewards estimated using these reward rate definitions determines the gain due to SFT. We evaluated the impact of 
seven different groups of halts on overall software dependability in the Tandem system: all software halts, the five 
mutually exclusive subsets of software halts (Table 4.4), and all non-software halts.
Table 6.2 shows the estimated steady-state reward loss due to the seven groups of halts for the two reward 
measures. The first row of the table shows that single-failure tolerance of the measured Tandem system reduced the 
loss of service incurred by all software halts by 96%, which clearly demonstrates the effectiveness x>f this fault toler­
ance mechanism against software failures. The table also shows that memory management is a potential dependabil­
ity bottleneck in the Tandem system: the software halts which occurred while the memory manager process was 
executing account for 50 % of the loss of service incurred by all software halts (with SFT). The percentage was 25 
with NSFT. A higher percentage of reward loss with SFT, compared with that with NSFT, indicates that the 
software halts which occurred while the memory manager process was executing tended to occur near-coincidentally 
on multiple operating systems.
The software halts under "all others" account for 65 % of the loss of service incurred by all software halts 
with NSFT. However, their real contribution to the measured system (with SFT) is about 17 %. This indicates that
Table 6.2. Steady-State Reward Loss (Tandem)
Source of Data
with SFT with NSFT
Reward L o sss f t  
Reward LossNSFTReward Loss Percentage Reward Loss Percentage
all s/w halts 0.00006 100% 0.00136 100% 4.4 %
s/w halts under non-process 0.00002 33% 0.00012 9 % 16.7 %
s/w halts under system monitor 0.0 0% 0.00000 0 %
s/w halts under memory manager 0.00003 50% 0.00034 25% 8.8 %
s/w halts under unknown 0.0 0% 0.00000 0 %
s/w halts under all others 0.00001 17% 0.00088 65 % 1.1 %
all non-s/w halts 0.00016 0.00206 7.8 %
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these were mostly single operating system failures. The high steady-state reward loss with NSFT indicates that it 
took longer to recover from some of these halts. Interpretation of the impact of the software halts under "non­
process" is less interesting because many of these were due to unexpected problems found by software during 
recoveries from power failures. This implies that the affected processors were already down due to power failures. 
Some of these halts occurred in two or three processors at almost the same time. There were not enough software 
halts under the system monitor or "unknown" to provide meaningful interpretations.
The last row of Table 6.2 shows that non-software halts caused more loss of service than software halts. This 
can be attributed to two reasons. First, some non-software halts which occur due to permanent hardware faults are 
resolved by replacing the faulty hardware, resulting in long recovery times and more loss of service. Second, non­
software halts can occur due to environmental or operational faults. An environmental or operational fault can 
potentially affect all processors in the system. Both the first and last rows of Table 6.2 show that, although the 
measured Tandem system was in a high-stress environment, the steady-state reward loss is small (with SFT). This 
reflects the high dependability of the measured system. The last row also shows that single-failure tolerance 
reduced the loss of service incurred by all non-software halts by 92%. The percentage is slightly lower than that for 
software halts, which is attributed to the non-software halts, due to environmental or operational faults, which 
affected the whole system.
B. Single Operating System
This subsection discusses a low-level modeling to describe error detection and recovery inside an operating 
system. The methodology is illustrated using the IBM/MVS data. The MVS operating system provides software 
fault tolerance through recovery management It also provides a flexible platform to build additional software fault 
tolerance at user level. Recovery routines in the MVS operating system provide a means by which the operating 
system prevents a total loss on the occurrence of software errors. When a program is abnormally interrupted due to 
an error, the supervisor routine gets the control. If the problem is such that further processing can degrade the sys­
tem or destroy data, the supervisor routine gives the control to Recovery Termination Manager (RTM), an operating 
system module responsible for error and recovery management If a recovery routine is available for the interrupted 
program, the RTM gives the control to this routine before it terminates the program. The purpose of a recovery
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routine is to free the resources kept by the failing program, to locate the error, and to request either a retry or the 
termination of the program. Recovery routines are generally provided to cover critical MVS functions. However, it 
is the responsibility of the installation (or the user) to write recovery routines for other programs.
More than one recovery routine can be specified for the same program. If the current recovery routine is 
unable to restore a valid state, the RTM can give the control to another recovery routine, if available. This process 
is called percolation. The percolation process ends if either a routine issues a valid retry request or no more 
recovery routines are available. In the latter case, the program and its related subtasks are terminated. If a valid 
retry is requested, a retry is attempted to restore a valid state using the information supplied by the recovery routine 
and gives the control to the program. In order for a retry to be valid, there should be no risk of error recurrence and 
the retry address should be properly specified. An error recovery can result in the following four situations:
(1) Resume operation (Resume Op) — The system successfully recovered from the error and returned the con­
trol to the interrupted program.
(2) Task Termination (Task term)— The program and its related subtasks are terminated, but the system 
didn’t fail.
(3) Job Termination (Job term)— The job in control at the time of the error is aborted.
(4) System Damage (System failure)— The job or task, which was terminated, is critical for system operation.
As a result of the termination, a system failure occurs.
Using the collected error and recovery data, we constructed a continuous-time Markov model that provides a 
complete view of the measured MVS operating system from the eiror detection to the recovery. The states of the 
model consists of the eight different types of error states and the four states resulting from error recoveries. Figure 
6.2 shows the model. The normal state represents that the operating system is running error-free. The transition 
probabilities were estimated from the measured data using Equation 6.1. Note that the system failure state is not 
shown in the figure. This is because the occurrence of system failure was rare and the number of observed system 
failures was statistically insignificant.
Table 6.3 shows the waiting time characteristics of the normal and error states in the model.3 The table shows
The waiting time for state i is the time that the system spends in state i before making a transition. Som e researchers 
have used the term sojourn time for this measure.
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Figure 6.2. Software Error/Recovery Model
25
Table 6.3. Waiting Time
State
# o f
obs
Mean Waiting Time 
(in seconds)
Standard
Deviation
Normal 2757 10461.33 32735.04
CTRL 213 21.92 84.21
DLCK 23 4.72 22.61
VO 1448 25.05 77.62
PE 65 4223 92.98
SE 149 36.82 79.59
SM 313 33.40 95.01
OTHR 66 1.86 12.98
MULT 481 175.59 252.79
that the duration of a single error is typically in the range of 20 to 40 seconds, except for deadlock (DLCK) and 
"others" (OTHR). The table also shows that errors of the type "others" (OTHR) are relatively insignificant because 
their average duration is less than 2 seconds. The average recovery time from a program exception is twice as long 
as that from a control error (21 seconds versus 42 seconds). This is probably due to the extensive software involve­
ment in recovering from program exceptions. Table 6.3 clearly brings out the importance of incorporating multiple 
errors (or error bursts) into a system model. The average duration of a multiple error is at least four times longer 
than that of any types of single error.
An error recovery can be as simple as a retry or can be more complex requiring several percolations before a 
retry. The problem can also be such that no retry or percolation is possible. Figure 6.2 shows that about 83.1% of 
all retries are successful. The table also shows that the operating system attempts to recover from 93.5% of I/O and 
data management errors and 78.4% of control related errors by retries. These observations indicate that most I/O 
and control related errors are relatively easy to recover from, compared to the other types of errors such as deadlock 
and storage errors. Also note that "no percolation" occurs only in recovering from storage management errors. This 
indicates that storage management errors are more complicated than the other types of errors. The problem can also 
be such that no retry or percolation is possible.
Model Behavior:
The dynamic behavior of the modeled operating system can be described by various probabilities. Given the 
irreducible semi-Markov model of Figure 6.2, the following steady-state probabilities were evaluated. The deriva­
tions of these measures are given in [Howard71],
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(1) transition probability (nj) — given that the system is now making a transition, the probability that the tran­
sition is to state j
(2) occupancy probability (<&,•) — at any instant of time the probability that the system occupies state j
(3) mean recurrence time (0;) — mean recurrence time of state j
The occupancy probability of the normal state can be viewed as the operating system availability without 
degradation. The state transition probability, chi the other hand, represents the dynamic behavior of the error detec­
tion and recovery processes in the operating system. Table 6.4(a) lists the state transition probabilities and occu­
pancy probabilities for the normal and error states. Table 6.4(b) lists the state transition probabilities and the mean 
recurrent times of the recovery and result states. A dashed line in the table indicates a negligible value (less than 
0.00001). Table 6.4(a) shows that the occupancy probability of the normal state in the model is 0.995. This indi­
cates that in 99.5% of time the operating system is running error-free. In 0.5% of time the operating system is in 
error or recovery states. Table 6.4(b) shows that in more than half of this time (i.e„ 0.29% out of 0.5%) the operat­
ing system is in the multiple error state. An early study on the MVS error/recovery showed that average reward rate 
for the software error/recovery state was 0.2736 [Hsueh88]. Based on this reward rate and the occupancy probabil­
ity for the error/recovery state obtained above (0.005), we estimate that the steady-state reward loss is 0.00363 
which is larger than that estimated for the Tandem and VAXcluster systems.
Table 6.4. Error/Recovery Model Characteristics
Measure
Normal
state
Error state
CTRL DLCK I/O PE SE SM OTHR MULT
7t
<I>
0.2474
0.9950
0.0191
0.00016
0.0020 0.1299
0.00125
0.0060
0.000098
0.0134
0.000189
0.0281
0.00036
0.0057 0.0431
0.002913
(a)
Recovery state Result
Measure Retry Percolation No-Percolation Resume on Task term Job term
K 0.1704 0.0845 0.0030 0.1414 0.0712 0.0348
e 4.25 8.55 241.43 5.11 10.16 20.74
* - in hour
(b)
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By solving the model (Figure 6.2), it is found that the operating system makes a transition every 43.37 
minutes. Table 6.4 shows that 24.74% of all transitions made in the model are to the normal state, 24.73% of them 
are to error states (obtained by summing all the re’s for all error states), 25.79% of them are to recovery states, and 
24.74% of them are to result states. Since a transition occurs every 43 minutes, we estimate that, on average, a 
software error is detected every three hours and a successful recovery (i.e., reaching the "resume op" state) occurs 
every five hours. This indicates that nearly 43% of all software errors result in task/job termination. Although very 
few (statistically insignificant number) of the task or job terminations lead to system failures, they do affect the user 
perceived reliability and availability of the system because the operating system recovers from more than 40% of the 
software errors via job or task termination. As a result of the termination, users may have to re-initiate the 
jobs/tasks. For long duration jobs/tasks, the performance loss (i.e., the loss of useful work) can be very high.
C. Summary
We presented two levels of modeling and reward analysis to describe and evaluate the dynamic software 
dependability behavior. The high-level modeling and reward analysis deals with distributed systems where multiple 
instances of operating systems interact, and was illustrated using the Tandem/GUARDIAN and VAX/VMS data. 
The low-level modeling focuses on error detection and recovery inside an operating system, and was illustrated 
using the IBM/MVS data. The results show that software is a significant source of service loss in the Tandem sys­
tem, while hardware is the dominant source of service loss in the VAXcluster. Although the measured Tandem sys­
tem is an experimental system working under accelerated stresses, the loss of service due to software problems is 
much smaller than that in the measured IBM/MVS and VAX/VMS systems. Further evaluation of the Tandem sys­
tem shows that single failure tolerance of the Tandem system reduced the service loss due to software failures by an 
order of magnitude and the memory management software is a potential reward bottleneck. The analysis of the 
MVS data shows that, although few software errors caused system failures, user-perceived reliability and availability 
is low because more than 40% of all software errors result in user job/task termination. The MVS data also shows 
that multiple errors, which constitute over 17% of all software errors, have long recovery times and hence can 
impose a considerable system performance degradation.
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VII. Error Correlation
When multiple instances of an operating systems interact with each other on a system, the issue of correlated 
errors/failures should be addressed. An early study shows [Tang92b] that even a small failure correlation or a few 
correlated failures can have a significant impact on system dependability. This section discusses software error 
correlations in the VAXcluster and Tandem systems.
We found that about 10% of software failures occurred on multiple machines concurrently in VAX1. It is 
instructive to examine these cases in detail to understand how software failures occurred concurrently on different 
machines. Figure 7.1 depicts a case scenario. In the figure, Europa, Jupiter, and Mercury are machine names in 
VAX1. A dashed line represents that the corresponding machine is in a failure state. At one time, a network error 
(netl) was reported from the Cl (Computer Interconnect) port on Europa. This resulted in a software failure (softl) 
13 seconds later. Twenty-four seconds after the first network error (netl), additional network errors (net2,net3) were 
reported on the second machine (Jupiter), which was followed by a software failure (soft2). The error sequence on 
Jupiter was repeated (net4,net5,soft3) on the third machine (Mercury). The three machines experienced software 
failures concurrently for 45.5 minutes. All three software failures occurred shortly after network errors occurred. 
Thus, sometimes network-related hardware or software problems cause concurrent software failures on multiple 
machines.
Figure 7.1. A Scenario of Concurrent Software Failures
netl softl reboot
Europa
13 sec. 47.83 min.
net2 net3 soft2 reboot
Jupiter
24 sec. 9 sec. 10 sec. 47.33 min.
net4 net5 soft3 reboot
Mercury
60 sec. 78 sec.1 11 sec. 45.5 min. 4 sec.
Note: softl, soft2, soft3 — Exception while above ASTDEL or on interrupt stack.
netl, net3, net5 — Port will be re-started. net2, net4 — Virtual circuit timeout
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The VAXcluster data shows another danger of network-related errors in the form of hardware-related 
software errors. If a software error (failure) occurs in close proximity (e.g., within a minute) to a hardware error, it 
is referred to as a hardware-related software error (failure) [Iyer85a]. The occurrence of hardware-related software 
errors can be explained in several ways. First, hardware errors can be detected by software. For instance, a 
hardware error, such as a flipped memory bit, may change the software condition, causing a software error. This 
software error can either be corrected by built-in software fault tolerance or result in a software failure. Second, 
hardware errors can cause software failures by exercising parts of the operating system such as recovery routines 
which are rarely used, thus activating dormant software faults.
Table 7.1 shows the total counts of hardware-related software errors and failures, and their percentages to all 
errors and failures (including those caused by hardware), respectively, in the two VAXcluster systems. Each operat­
ing system was treated as an independent entity. The table shows that, out of 32 hardware-related software errors, 
28 resulted in software failures, which shows the severity of hardware-related software errors. Closer examination 
of the data shows that network errors are responsible for most hardware-related software errors (75%).
Network errors are not only the major source of hardware-related software failures, but also related to a 
significant portion of correlated machine failures which are not reported as software failures [Tang92b]. All these 
failures are believed to occur in or relate to the network interface software in I/O management routines. Thus, we 
speculate that the network-related software is a reliability bottleneck in the measured VAXcluster systems.
The Tandem GUARDIAN data shows that about 20% of the software halts occurred concurrently on multiple 
operating systems. A significant portion of these concurrent software failures are believed to be related to software 
development/testing efforts on the measured system. However, there were three occasions where software halts 
occurring while the memory manager process was executing, resulted in system coldloads - restarts of all instances 
of the operating system. In one case, a single software halt due to an illegal address reference by the memory
Table 7.1. Hardware-Related Software Errors (VAXclusters)
Measure Frequency Percentage
Error 32 18.9
Failure 28 21.4
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manager process resulted in a system coldload. In the other two cases, software halts occurred near-coincidentally 
on multiple processors due to problems in accessing the system disk. Recall that each operating system on the Tan­
dem system relies on the system disk, which is accessed through either processor 0 or 1, for all additional operating 
system related procedures and files. As a result, these two processors and the system disk are more important than 
others from a dependability perspective. We believe that the high-stress environment of the measured system pro­
vided us with the rare opportunity to observe multiple component failure situations, and revealed this potential 
dependability bottleneck, i.e., problems in accessing the system disk. This burden can be alleviated by duplicating 
the procedures and files on another disk controlled by another pair of processors.
The above observations indicate that a failure of the measured Tandem system is likely to occur due to a sin­
gle severe software halt or due to concurrent software halts cm multiple processors caused by common causes (not 
due to a random coincidence of multiple independent software halts). Elimination of the underlying causes of these 
severe software halts will improve the reliability of the overall software. However, it should be cautioned that this 
study was based on an experiment on a Tandem system under accelerated stress. Further investigation is necessary 
based on more experiments and experiments on field systems.
In this section, we investigated correlated software failures and hardware-related software errors in the meas­
ured VAXcluster and Tandem systems. Correlated failures can stress recovery and break the protection provided by 
"single-failure" tolerance. To identify the sources of correlated failures is necessary for improving dependability. 
Our results show that the network-related software of the VAX/VMS and the memory management of the 
Tandem/GUARDIAN are potential software bottlenecks in terms of correlated failures. Providing additional fault 
tolerance in software to resolve these bottlenecks will significantly improve the dependability of these systems. 
Modeling of correlated failures has not been well addressed in literature. Model specification for correlated failures 
can be complex and additional stiffness may arise in the model solution because correlated failures are infrequent 
events. The fact that about 10% of software failures on VAX1 and 20% of software failures on the Tandem system 
occurred concurrently on multiple machines suggests that correlated failures cannot be neglected.
VUI. Conclusion
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In this paper, we demonstrated a methodology to model and evaluate the fault tolerance characteristics of 
operational software. The methodology was illustrated through case studies on three different operating systems: the 
Tandem/GUARDIAN system, the VAX/VMS system, and the IBM/MVS system. Measurements were made on 
these systems for substantial periods to collect software error and recovery data Major software problems and error 
characteristics were identified by statistical analysis. A two level modeling approach was used to model and evaluate 
error and recovery processes inside an operating system and cm multiple instances of an operating system running in 
a distributed environment Based on the models, reward analysis is conducted to evaluate the loss of service due to 
software errors and the effect of fault-tolerance techniques implemented in the systems. Software error correlation 
in multicomputer systems is also investigated.
Results show that I/O management and program flow control are the major sources of software problems in 
the IBM/MVS and VAX/VMS operating systems, while memory management is the major source of software prob­
lems in the Tandem/GUARDIAN operating system. Software errors tend to occur in bursts on both IBM and VAX 
machines. This phenomenon is less pronounced in the Tandem system, which can be attributed to its fault-tolerant 
design. The fault-tolerance in the Tandem system reduced its loss of service due to software failures by an order of 
magnitude. Although the measured Tandem system is an experimental system working under accelerated stresses, 
the loss of service due to software problems is much smaller than that in the measured IBM/MVS and VAX/VMS 
systems.
It is shown that the software Time To Error distributions obtained from the data are not simple exponentials. 
This is in contrast with the common assumption of exponential failure times made in fault-tolerant software models. 
Both the VAXcluster and Tandem data showed that a multicomputer software Time Between Error distribution can 
be modeled by a 2-phase hyperexponential random variable: a lower rate error pattern which characterizes regular 
errors, and a higher rate error pattern which characterizes error bursts and concurrent errors on multiple machines. 
Investigation on error correlations found that about 10% of software failures in VAX1 and 20% in the Tandem sys­
tem occurred currently on multiple machines. It was suspected that the network-related software in the VAXcluster 
and memory management software in the Tandem system are software reliability bottlenecks, in terms of concurrent 
failures^
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It should be emphasized that the results of this study should not be interpreted as a direct comparison between 
the three measured operating systems, but rather an illustration of the proposed methodologies. The differences in 
operating system architectures, instrumentation conditions, measurement periods, and operational environments 
make a direct comparison impossible.
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